[This document can be acquired from a sub-directory coombspapers via anonymous FTP on the node COOMBS.ANU.EDU.AU] [Last updated: 12 June 1992] ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Working Paper 1991/3 Continuity and change in cooperative international regimes: the politics of the recent environment debate in Antarctica Lorraine M. Elliott Canberra June 1991 National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication Entry Elliott, Lorraine. Continuity and change in cooperative international regimes. ISBN 0 7315 1213 8. 1.Antarctic Treaty (1959). 2. Geopolitics Antarctic regions. 3. Australia Foreign relations. 4. France Foreign relations. I. Australian National University. Department of International Relations. II. Title. (Series: Working paper (Australian National University. Dept. of International Relations); 1991/3.) 327.10109989 Ó Lorraine M. Elliott department of international relations working papers The Department's Working Paper series seeks to provide readers with access to current research on international relations. Reflecting the wide range of interest in the Department, it will include topics on global international politics and the international political economy, the Asian-Pacific region and issues of concern to Australian foreign policy. Publication as a 'Working Paper' does not preclude subsequent publication in scholarly journals or books, indeed it may facilitate publication by providing feedback from readers to authors. Unless otherwise stated, publications of the Department of International Relations are presented without endorsement as contributions to the public record and debate. Authors are responsible for their own analysis and conclusions. Department of International Relations Research School of Pacific Studies Australian National University Canberra ACT Australia Abstract In May 1989 the government of Australia (joined soon after by that of France) announced that, on environmental grounds, it would not sign the Antarctic Minerals Convention which it had helped negotiate. Both governments announced that they would pursue instead the negotiation of a comprehensive environmental protection convention for the Antarctic. Neither move was greeted well by those governments' Antarctic Treaty partners, not least because they went against long-established and accepted conventions on decision-making in the Antarctic Treaty system and appeared to pose a threat to the stability of that system. This paper analyses the Australian and French decisions in the context of an exploration of continuity and change in international cooperative regimes and the normative and instrumental frameworks of the Antarctic Treaty system. Continuity and change in cooperative international regimes: the politics of the recent environment debate in Antarctica Lorraine M. Elliott* Introduction In May 1989 the Australian government, later joined by that of France, announced that it would not sign the recently negotiated Antarctic Minerals Convention (CRAMRA)1 on the grounds that minerals activity in the Antarctic was environmentally unacceptable. Both countries, which are signatories to the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, had participated in the lengthy negotiation of the Minerals Convention and the signatures of both were required to effect its entry into force. Australia and France further announced that they would jointly pursue a ban on all minerals activities in the Antarctic and the negotiation of a comprehensive conservation convention by which the continent would be declared a 'Natural Reserve ½ Land of Science'. Neither move was greeted well by their Treaty partners, not least because they went against long-established and accepted conventions on decision-making in the Antarctic Treaty system and appeared to pose a threat to the stability of that system. At a recent annual meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, the Director of the British Antarctic Survey, Dr David Drewry, had this to say about the Australian and French proposals: 'if we are too outside the norms that will be accepted by other Antarctic Treaty countries we have a good chance of scuppering the existing treaty arrangements and we will go back to much more nationalistic views' (cited in Pockley l990). The implications to be drawn from this are 1. that there is a set of norms which are understood to guide relationships within the Treaty system, and that these norms are defined and constrained by their collective utility within the system. 2. that there is a perception that deviation from those norms will result in instability in the Antarctic Treaty system. 3. that one of the functions of the normative framework, and of the Treaty system itself, is to moderate nationalistic views, from which we might assume that this moderation is considered to be a good thing. This paper analyses this Antarctic case study within the context of an exploration of continuity and change in cooperative international regimes. In doing so it considers the role of shared norms and understandings in guiding and defining relationships between states on an issue area (whether narrow or broadly defined) and investigates the implications for that cooperative relationship of a defection from accepted patterns of behaviour. It sketches the normative and instrumental frameworks of the Antarctic Treaty system before proceeding to a brief discussion of the negotiation of the minerals convention which locates that process within the established frameworks.2 The paper then offers an analysis of the actions taken by Australia and France. Cooperative International Regimes A cooperative arrangement between states is likely to be 'established and adhered to when the anticipated costs to the relevant actors (as perceived by them) of unilateral business-as-usual policies clearly will be greater than the costs of establishing and maintaining cooperative regimes and adhering to their behavioural norms' (S. Brown 1988:262). States will act cooperatively in order to reduce the possibility of conflict between them. They will cooperate if they perceive that a shared problem cannot be solved without some form of international collaboration taking place or that particular interests can best be met by acting in concert. Behavioural norms, and the decision-making procedures that are informed by them, are defined both by the purpose of the regime and the expectations of the relevant states on the issue-area, and by the norms and values of the international order within which the regime is embedded. A collective good, in the form of cooperative arrangements, is thus provided which creates a framework for ongoing interaction between states and imparts an element of certainty to those interactions. It establishes an understanding of acceptable behaviour within the regime. The shared expectation is that all states involved will adhere to the norms because it is in their interests to do so. New actors in the regime are also expected to adhere to these norms (based on an understanding that they have joined the regime because they too perceive benefits that are not possible with nonparticipation). The process of participating in the regime, and the example of other states' adherence to the normative framework, give strength to this socialisation process.3 Further, sunk costs (that is, a past investment of effort) are also understood to provide an incentive to maintain the existing regime (by adhering to the norms and procedures) rather than abandoning it for unilateral action or a new cooperative mechanism.4 Decision-making processes and perceptions of acceptable outcomes both reflect and reinforce the normative framework. The acceptability of an outcome, in the judgement of the states involved, is assessed not only in terms of how well it addresses the issue at hand, but also in terms of the extent to which it fits with the norms of the regime. Defection from the norms of a regime is considered to be unacceptable behaviour because it creates uncertainty and instability. Where such defection occurs, even if it is temporary, we should ask why this happens, and consider what effect this might have on the functioning of the regime. When states seek to alter established processes, in other words to effect an internal reordering of the regime, again we should ask why and to what effect. The Antarctic Treaty System The form of cooperative arrangement in the Antarctic (the 'collective good') centres on the Antarctic Treaty. That treaty5, which came into effect on 23 June 1961, is the principal piece of international law applicable to the Antarctic. It is, in fact, a modest document of only fourteen articles which establishes that the continent should be used only for peaceful purposes and should not become the scene or object of international discord. The continent is effectively non-militarised, non-nuclearised and non-nationalised. The latter is achieved through the vehicle of Article IV which puts the vexatious sovereignty question (discussed later in the paper) 'on hold'. International scientific cooperation is established as the primary focus of human activity in the Antarctic. The Treaty also establishes a two-tier category of membership in the Treaty system ½ Consultative Parties who are the decision-making states by virtue of their conduct of substantial scientific research activity in the Antarctic, and Non-consultative Parties (NCPs) who have acceded to the Treaty, but who have not been accorded decision-making status.6 The maintenance of this division is justified by the Consultative Parties on the grounds that only those Treaty states which maintain Antarctic programs and have thus demonstrated their interest in the Antarctic have the necessary knowledge and expertise to make informed decisions. The translation into practice of the principles and objectives of the Treaty has given rise to the Antarctic Treaty system (ATS). The ATS is the 'whole complex of arrangements made for the purposes of regulating relations among states' in the Antarctic (Handbook l989:xii). This includes not only the Antarctic Treaty, but recommendations adopted at Consultative Meetings, actions taken by states to give effect to those recommendations, and three separately negotiated multilateral agreements.7 Also included under this broad term, which describes a dynamic process as well as a set of rules, are the results of the Meetings of Experts, of Special Consultative Meetings and, at a non-governmental level, the work done by the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research. The Treaty system has been characterised as an 'essentially pragmatic formulation' which sustains a 'continued process of compromise and adaptation' (Orrego Vicuna 1987:66). States Interests As Auburn (1982:44) has noted, '[P]olar programmes are directly carried out, supported and funded by governments whose purpose is to preserve national interests' (my emphasis). However, while each Treaty party articulates its own policy objectives8 in the Antarctic, which may not be shared by other Treaty parties, there is nevertheless a shared perception by them that those specific objectives can best be served by participation in, and by maintenance of, the Treaty system. As Shapley (1984:30) bluntly puts it 'the Treaty has worked because it suits the individual national interests of those countries with stakes in Antarctica ½ not because it asks them, in effect, to join hands and sing'. The treaty system provides a mechanism whereby seemingly irreconcilable differences, especially over matters relating to the sovereignty issue, can be accommodated. 'Each treaty member still feels that it can achieve the greatest benefit through cooperation and group decision-making' (Joyner and Theiss 1987:88). The Antarctic Treaty system (the 'collective good') does not substitute for or compromise those national interests: it complements them. Before considering the substantive components of the normative framework, it is useful to identify briefly the various groupings of states which are signatories to the Treaty. For the seven countries9 which claim territorial sovereignty in the Antarctic, the Treaty regime provides a vehicle whereby the fact of their claims is recognised, even though their validity in international law is disputed. Of those claims, which are based variously on discovery, exploration, acts of administration, geographic proximity and historical inheritance, only five are mutually recognised (Britain, Australia, New Zealand, France and Norway). None are recognised by the non-claimant Treaty parties, mainly on the grounds that inchoate title has not been perfected in accordance with the principles of international law. Neither are they recognised by any non-Treaty party, many of whom argue that the Antarctic is terra communis and therefore not subject to territorial appropriation at all. Article IV of the Treaty enables all states party to the Treaty to continue to maintain without prejudice their positions on the territorial claims. It also establishes that, while the Treaty is in force, no act or activity can be used to extend, establish or diminish a claim. The Treaty therefore effectively releases the claimants from costly (and possibly unsuccessful) unilateral enforcement and defence of their territorial claims. The Soviet Union and the USA have similar interests in the Antarctic. 'There is a strong convergence of Soviet and US concerns to preserve the status quo of the Antarctic regime' (Boczek 1984:858). Each has an interest in maintaining an active political and scientific role in the Antarctic as part of the superpower balancing act and the Treaty system provides a means for this to happen without confrontation. Both superpowers maintain an extensive scientific presence in the Antarctic. While neither have formally asserted a claim to territorial sovereignty both nations have reserved their future rights to make a claim, a position which is also recognised by Article IV of the Treaty. The other non-claimant consultative parties may have less of a vested political interest in the Antarctic. However the Treaty regime provides for their participation in Antarctic decision-making on a supposedly equal footing with the claimant states and the superpowers. The emphasis on international cooperation in scientific research enables the less well off non-claimants to participate in collaborative research activities that might otherwise be denied them for reasons of budgetary constraint. The interests of non-consultative parties (NCPs) which might best be met through participation in the present regime are less easy to identify. However, accession to the Treaty does open up the possibility for participation in scientific research and therefore in decision-making. Since 1983 NCPs have been able to attend consultative meetings as observers, although this does not include the right to participate in formal decision-making. This so-called 'internal accommodation' was perceived by the Consultative Parties as a way of strengthening the commitment of NCPs to the Treaty system in the face of challenges, through the United Nations, to the legitimacy of the regime. The question of possible benefit from resource activity should not be overlooked. It is a fundamental reason for the increase in accessions to the Treaty and applications for consultative status over the last ten years. This has given rise to another set of interests within the Treaty system which sits across the more traditional groupings outlined above, that of the developing countries who define their interests to include access to the benefits of resource exploitation, particularly in the context of the minerals negotiations.10 The Normative Framework The norms which are expected to inform both individual state and collective decision-making behaviour in this system derive from the historical circumstances of the negotiation of the Treaty and have been reinforced by the practice of the Treaty system. They can be identified, in their simplest formulation, as follows i. conflict avoidance (and conflict resolution); ii. maintenance of the political compromise on sovereignty11; iii. consensus decision-making. i. Conflict avoidance The Antarctic Treaty was negotiated in 1959 to reduce the likelihood of recurring conflict in the Antarctic. This was explicitly stated in the note US President Eisenhower sent, in 1958, to the eleven states who were invited to join with the United States in negotiating an Antarctic treaty: an agreement would have the 'additional advantage of preventing unnecessary and undesirable political rivalries and [avoiding] uneconomic expenditure of funds to defend individual national interests and the recurrent possibility of international misunderstanding' (cited in Hanessian 1960:457). Antarctic nations had been unable to reach even preliminary agreement in the late 1940s and early 1950s on the format of a legal regime for the continent. The Antarctic Treaty was finally negotiated at a time when escalation of conflicts in the region seemed likely.12 Two major sources of conflict were identified. The first was that over the sovereignty claims and particularly between Britain, Argentina and Chile whose claims overlapped. Their warships and naval expeditions had patrolled the region, shots had been exchanged between land-based expeditions and heated diplomatic correspondence had been entered into in support of territorial claims and rights of jurisdiction.13 The second possible source of conflict was that between the superpowers. There was considerable anxiety over growing Soviet activity in the Antarctic and the announcement by that country of its intention to stay on after the International Geophysical Year finished.14 Each superpower was reluctant to let the other gain the upper hand. The spectre of Cold War tensions moving southward was thus raised. Avoiding conflict was clearly in the interests of all parties concerned. Agreement on the best way to do this was possible, in the final analysis, because states had reason to believe that without it their national interests might be prejudiced (Oxman 1978:296). John Heap15 (1983:105) explains it this way: 'few, if any of the governments invited were attracted by the positive aspects of the Treaty. The crucial stimulus was fear. Each government had its own scenario of the chaos it foresaw if the Treaty was not successfully concluded.' Conflict-avoidance was therefore established very early on as a normative factor in Antarctic decision-making. It was given specific expression in the non-militarisation and 'peaceful purposes' clauses of the Treaty. The Treaty also acts as a conflict resolution mechanism. The mechanism for dispute settlement established under the Treaty (even though it has been called weak and permissive) has not been resorted to because of a shared understanding that differences should be managed informally within the operation of the consultative process. There is a further understanding that differences between Treaty parties on non-Antarctic matters will not intrude on the functioning of the regime. ii. Political compromise Part of that process of avoiding conflict required some form of settlement between the claimant and non-claimant states. The claimant states (with the possible exception of New Zealand) were not prepared to give up their claims in 1959. Neither were the non-claimants prepared to recognise the validity in international law of those claims. Both positions had to be accommodated in any negotiated solution and it was the deliberate ambiguity of Article IV discussed earlier which permitted this. Nevertheless it should be stressed that this does not solve the sovereignty problem: it simply puts it to one side as long as the Treaty is in force. Without it a successful negotiation would not have been possible. Joyner (1988:83) notes that from its inception 'the claimant versus non-claimant schism has assumed predominant consideration in shaping rules and institutions' in the ATS. The cooperative regime that evolved through the mechanism of Consultative Meetings and other decision-making processes has been informed by the need to protect the political compromises upon which the Treaty rests. iii. Consensus decision-making Avoiding conflict within the Treaty system, and sustaining the difficult political compromises which underpinned the Treaty, has reinforced the need for consensus. The practice of reaching agreement by a consensus process, which informed the negotiation of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959, was formalised in the Treaty itself, and has been accepted as a fundamental component of the normative framework of the regime. As Peterson notes (1988:94) this rule 'has remained undisturbed16 because it is essential to the continued existence of the regime'. Under Article IX(4) of the Treaty any recommendations formulated at meetings of the treaty parties are recommendations only to governments.17 They do not come into effect until all governments whose representatives participated in the relevant meeting have agreed to them, establishing an effective veto.18 Without such a qualification, it is doubtful that the claimant states would have agreed to the Treaty. The specific results of the decision-making process can therefore be understood as representing a collective agreement which all relevant states have been able to accept as not being contrary to their perceived individual interests. While Treaty states have continued to adhere to the consensus rule, the process of reaching that consensus and the nature of the compromises have changed over the duration of the Treaty as more states have become involved in decision-making on Antarctic matters. Until 1977 the twelve original signatories were the only states involved in decision-making on Antarctic matters. Poland became a Consultative Party in 197719 but since 1981 the number of Consultative Parties has increased by fourteen. (As well, another sixteen states have acceded to the Treaty as Nonconsultative Parties.)20 Beeby (1990:16) has noted that it is now 'much less easy to generate a dynamic that will lead to a consensus acceptable to all' and has suggested that if there is any significant increase in the number of decision-making states, 'there might need to be a search for new methods of arriving at consensus'. It may also be more difficult to inculcate the norms of the Treaty system and to give continuing strength and certainty to the expectation that all parties will continue to adhere to them. The Instrumental Framework Within the context of this normative framework, decision-making processes in the Antarctic Treaty system have given rise to particular institutional characteristics. Meetings of the Consultative Parties are normally held every two years. While recommendations are not adopted at Consultative Meetings unless all representatives find them acceptable, and thus conflict over outcomes might be avoided, the search for consensus means that decision-making processes are frequently slow. The system is 'decentralised and functionally oriented' (Triggs 1986:17; Scully 1986:406). Shapley (1988:316) refers to the pragmatic tradition of Antarctic administration by which 'rules were adopted only for immediate problems: sweeping principles were eschewed in favour of limited measures'. The consultative parties create new institutions and techniques only as and when necessary in response to a well-defined need and well-defined problems requiring collective action (Scully 1986:405). Opposition to formal institutional arrangements has most often been grounded in the reluctance by some states to accept any arrangement that is perceived to have the potential to undermine claimed sovereign rights, or to interfere with national autonomy over Antarctic programs.21 This reluctance to vest any authority in a 'supra-national' body has meant that no formal mechanisms have been established to ensure compliance with the rules agreed to for the management of particular activities in the Antarctic. Enforcement measures have, in the past, been perceived as a threat to national autonomy and therefore to the political compromises upon which the Treaty system rests. In the 1960s and 1970s there was little challenge to the consultative parties' own perceptions of the success of the Treaty system both in terms of dealing with practical aspects of managing human activity in the Antarctic, and in terms of representing their collective interests and strengthening the Treaty. The international community was, on the whole, not particularly interested in the Antarctic. In the 1980s, however, that indifference gave way to an attention which was generated by two issues which had received scant attention in the Treaty the question of environmental protection and the question of exploitation of resources, particularly mineral resources.22 Protection of the Antarctic Environment Environmental and conservation topics had come to dominate the consultative agenda23 and as early as the Sixth Consultative Meeting in 1970 the Consultative Parties conferred upon themselves the collective responsibility for protecting the vulnerable Antarctic environment. Decision-making processes on this issue followed the pattern already described. The practice was essentially pragmatic, ad hoc and incremental with no systematic attempt to provide for an all-embracing code for the governance of environmental protection (Handbook 1989:xii). There is, therefore, no mechanism to ensure compliance with environmental protection rules. The Consultative Parties record of environmental protection in the Antarctic was subject to increasing scrutiny in the 1980s. Critics, particularly environmental organisations, judged the outcome of decision-making on environmental issues not by their fit with the norms of the Treaty system (consensus, conflict-avoidance and maintenance of the political compromise) but on the basis of their success in protecting the Antarctic environment. They argued that the environment should not be the subject of political compromise and trade-offs. Concern was evinced over the slowness of decision-making on the environment when speedy decisions were often required.24 Criticisms have also focused on the voluntary nature of compliance with recommendations which, it is charged, effectively leaves each country free to engage in activities which may cause environmental damage, subject only to its own laws and sense of responsibility (Corn et al 1988:1). Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) have pointed to persistent violations of Treaty recommendations as evidence of the inadequacy of existing mechanisms for protection of the Antarctic environment.25 While acknowledging the growing awareness and efforts of many Treaty parties to improve their record of environmental protection with respect to the management of their national programs as well as the rules adopted at consultative meetings, they charge that it is neither fast enough nor far enough. Minerals The most recent, and most public, battle over environmental protection in the Antarctic has been fought on the question of regulating minerals activities and the negotiation of the Minerals Convention. Discussions on this issue among Treaty parties were informed by a shared concern to avoid conflict between them and a desire to maintain their control over decision-making on Antarctic matters. As with other processes in the Antarctic Treaty system, the conduct of the formal negotiations for a minerals convention was firmly grounded in the norms of consensus and political compromise. 'Negotiations were a process necessary to create an environment in which any such mineral resource activities [would] not undermine the basic understandings and political compromises at the heart of the Antarctic Treaty system' (Colson 1986:297). The consensus process was made explicit through the mechanism of a Chairperson's personal report which came to be used as the informal negotiating text for each subsequent meeting.26 Conflict avoidance was a reason both for setting the issue to one side, and then for bringing it onto the agenda. In testimony to a House Oversight Subcommittee in March 1990, William Westermeyer (1990:7) of the Office of Technology Assessment (attached to the US Congress) noted that the Convention's 'most important purpose (my emphasis) is to enhance peace in Antarctica and the stability of the Antarctic Treaty System by making it more difficult for conflicts over minerals to occur'. Treaty parties had been wary of addressing the issue of non-living resources in the Antarctic, because it raised the difficult and potentially conflictive question of who owned the resources which was inextricably linked with the question of the territorial claims and the exercise of sovereignty. It was for this reason that the matter had been omitted from the 1959 negotiations. The issue moved onto the agenda as a result of the oil-shock of the 1970s27, and exploratory work in the Southern Ocean which showed traces of offshore hydrocarbons.28 Further, the negotiations for the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea were perceived as the source of a possible challenge to the Consultative Parties' claimed right to manage and regulate the development of natural resources in the Antarctic Treaty Area, especially the 'high seas'. Once it became clear to the Treaty parties that this was an issue which would not go away, they determined that decisions upon the form and content of a legal regime should be made, by them, before any economically viable discoveries were made which might render agreement among them more difficult.29 The issue was raised informally during early Consultative Meetings, but did not reach the consultative agenda until 1972. A series of meetings of experts30 was convened, beginning a lengthy process which, because of the need for consensus at every step, had only just reached the stage of formal negotiation a decade later. In 1977, a policy of voluntary restraint on all exploration and exploitation of Antarctic mineral resources was agreed to, conditional upon timely progress being made towards adoption of an agreed regime on these activities. In accordance with a 1981 recommendation (XI-1) a Special Consultative Meeting was finally convened for the purposes of elaborating a 'regime for Antarctic mineral resources'.31 The principles upon which this regime were to be based included, inter alia, an active role for the Consultative Parties, maintenance of the Treaty system in its entirety, protection of the unique Antarctic environment, and that the provisions of Article IV of the Treaty (on sovereignty) should not be affected and indeed should be safeguarded.32 As Beck notes, 'the minerals question came to be seen as a test of the ATS' ability to reconcile divergent interests within the parameters of the regime' (Beck 1989:67). The first meeting of the SCM was held in Wellington in June 1982.33 Eleven more formal sessions followed over a period of six years. The New Zealand diplomat who chaired the meetings has observed that 'differences about sovereignty [were] a major source of difficulty in the negotiations [as well as] a large part of the reason for embarking on them in the first place' (Beeby 1990:6). The convention, given the title of Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities34, was agreed to by all negotiating parties on 2 June 1988 and opened for signature on 25 November of that year. It is a framework agreement, 'grounded in the principle of preserving the delicate compromise' of the Treaty system (Joyner 1988:83), which establishes institutions and procedural guidelines for decision-making on mineral resource activities, under the control of the Consultative Parties. There were two major sources of international criticism of the process and content of the minerals negotiations. The first came from non-governmental organisations concerned about the environmental implications of Antarctic minerals activities, and the second from non-Treaty parties, led by Malaysia, who challenged the Treaty parties' claimed right to make decisions about minerals activity and to benefit from their exploitation. Environmental organisations argued that minerals activity in the Antarctic was incompatible with environmental protection. The Treaty parties, they said, had begun from a questionable premise by assuming that minerals activity would occur, rather than asking whether such activity should occur or not. They alleged that the Convention would encourage mining because, by establishing licensing authorities, it effectively provided a solution to the question of property rights and would provide mining companies with security of tenure over any finds made during exploration. The Convention was portrayed by its supporters (including, initially, representatives of the Australian government) as the most balanced and environmentally sound framework that could be achieved. Chris Beeby (1988:5) argued that 'the Convention contains a very tight and comprehensive system of environmental protection ... these provisions are the most stringent that have ever been negotiated in an international document'. However environmental organisations charged that the principles on environmental protection were weak and susceptible to interpretation and that the compliance and enforcement mechanisms were ambiguous and diffuse.35 They argued that the environmental protection mechanisms had been watered down during the negotiations. While some Consultative Parties (especially Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom) had supported strict environmental safeguards36 over minerals activities it appears that it was difficult for proponents of strong environmental measures to withstand the need for political compromise. Analysis of the Beeby negotiating texts, as well as of the many articles written by 'Antarcticists' while the negotiations were in train, indicate that environmental components, while important, nevertheless received 'less attention than the organisational structure of the regime' (Laws 1985:54). Environmental organisations adopted a two-pronged strategy in challenging the minerals convention. Generally they opposed its negotiation (and later its ratification) calling instead for the Antarctic to be declared a wilderness reserve or world park. Activists who were close to the meetings, or who were on national delegations, lobbied within the Treaty system for stringent environmental protection mechanisms, in the event (which seemed most likely at that stage) that the convention was successfully negotiated and implemented. The challenge from non-Treaty parties was motivated by a desire to share in the economic benefits of minerals exploitation in the Antarctic. Their general criticism was of the Treaty system as an exclusive and secretive club of industrialised nations intent on exploiting the Antarctic for their own benefit. They argued that the Antarctic was a global commons and, as such, should be subject to decision-making by the whole international community, not just a self-selected part of it. Resolutions adopted in the United Nations General Assembly from the mid-1980s called for a moratorium on the minerals negotiations until such time as all interested states could participate in the negotiation of a regime which would ensure the application to the Antarctic of the common heritage principle anticipated by the Law of the Sea Convention. Defection from Consensus: commitment to new processes The signature and ratification of, inter alia, all claimant states, was required before the Minerals Convention could come into effect.37 The expectation among the Consultative Parties was that the consensus would be maintained and that the convention would come into force. There is, of course, always the possibility of a breakdown in a negotiated consensus when an international agreement is subject to domestic political processes for ratification.38 However, consensus on the Antarctic minerals convention broke down at a stage even before ratification. On 22 May 1989 Prime Minister Hawke announced that, on environmental grounds, Australia would not even sign the Convention.39 A joint statement issued by the Prime Minister, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister for the Environment said that while recognising that the Minerals Convention was very much better than having no protective regime of any kind, it was both desirable and possible to seek stronger protection for the world's last great wilderness. Australia, they said, would therefore pursue the urgent negotiation of a comprehensive environmental protection convention within the framework of the Antarctic Treaty system. On 18 August 1989 a joint statement was issued by Prime Minister Hawke and French Prime Minister Rocard during the latter's visit to Australia. It recorded their agreement that mining in Antarctica was not compatible with protection of the fragile environment. Further, it stated that the two countries would be proposing that the Treaty parties negotiate a Comprehensive Environment Protection Convention which would turn the Antarctic into a wilderness reserve.40 Later elaborations of this proposal suggested that a comprehensive conservation convention should contain general environmental principles and standards by which all activities in the Antarctic would be judged, protective measures and appropriate institutional machinery, including a new Antarctic Environment Commission which would be vested with decision-making powers. Neither announcement was well received by other Treaty parties. Publicly and in private diplomats expressed concern at the way in which Australia and France had undermined the consensus approach to Antarctic decision-making41 and reneged on an agreement which had taken six difficult years to negotiate. The United States government characterised the Australian/French stance as 'undercutting the Treaty which has provided a uniquely [sic] and successful political mechanism for dealing with activities in Antarctica'.42 The then New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs said that 'Australia [would] have a good deal to answer for if it fails' (New Scientist 1989:20). A former director of the Australian Antarctic Division prophesied that 'if Australia refuses to sign, she will be utterly discredited among the treaty nations and will be branded [by them] as naive, ignorant and obstructive' (Law 1989:12). Further, the suggestion for a comprehensive environmental protection convention challenged the accepted instrumental framework of the Treaty system. In refusing to sign the Minerals Convention, Australia and France brought into question the strength of the collective understanding within the Treaty system that all states would abide by the norms of the system. By going 'public' they are perceived to have also resiled from the use of the Treaty system for conflict resolution. Other Treaty parties argued that in the absence of an effective consensual working agreement on minerals activity the spectre of possible conflict which they had hoped to avoid would be once more on the agenda. The defection by Australia and France from the norms of the Treaty system was directed towards a particular decision-making outcome, rather than a rejection of the value of the Treaty system or the normative framework as a whole. Australia and France have been at pains to stress their continuing support for the Treaty system as fundamental to their own interests in the Antarctic. Representatives of both countries have stressed that the search for consensus should inform negotiations among Treaty parties on the question of strengthening environmental protection measures within the Treaty system. However, the long-term impact of their actions on the internal dynamic of the Treaty system, and implications for the future strength of the normative component of the Treaty system are as yet unclear. Joyner (1989:96) has queried whether this development might signal a 'breakdown of trust and cooperation among the Antarctic Treaty parties'. Has a precedent for defection been set? Will it be more difficult to expect adherence to the norms? Is there now a greater component of uncertainty in the Antarctic Treaty system? There appeared to be a consensus among the Treaty parties on the need to address the issue of comprehensive environmental protection measures, and widespread recognition that it was incumbent upon the Treaty system to be seen to be genuinely responsive to international demands that protection be improved. Differences of opinion on the way in which this should be achieved have centred on a continuation of the incremental approach or the adoption of an overarching convention. The question of the establishment of comprehensive environmental protection measures for the Antarctic was considered at length at the 15th Consultative Meeting in Paris in 1989.43 Proposals tabled by New Zealand, Chile, the United States and Sweden encompassed a variety of suggestions for improving the system of environmental protection, but none went so far as to recommend, as the Australian/French proposal did, the negotiation of a separate convention setting out broad principles to guide all decision-making on the environment and human activity in the Antarctic. ATCM 15 recommended the convening of a special consultative meeting to consider the question of comprehensive environmental measures further.44 In spite of the initial adverse reaction, support for the Australian and French proposals for a ban on minerals activity and on the need for a separate convention on environmental protection in the Antarctic grew in the months after May 1989. One of the most significant decisions was that by the New Zealand government in February 1990 to set aside ratification of CRAMRA (that country had already signed) in order to explore ways of breaking the deadlock. The then Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer (who also held the environment portfolio) explained that the debate over CRAMRA was diverting attention from wider issues of environmental protection for the Antarctic, and that thirteen or fourteen serious environmental problems were not being considered because the debate over CRAMRA was standing in the way.45 He did not elaborate further on the nature of those environmental problems. In June 1989 the Belgian Government passed legislation prohibiting Belgian nationals from participating in minerals activities in the Antarctic.46 Italy, Greece, Austria, India and Spain also expressed support for setting CRAMRA to one side. The US Congress passed legislation directing the Bush administration to pursue a ban on mining activity in the Antarctic for the 'indefinite future'.47 The first session of the Special Consultative Meeting on comprehensive environmental protection measures was held in Chile in November 1990, the first time that the Consultative Parties had met in a special session devoted exclusively to the environment. At that session the Australian/French proposal was formally supported by Belgium and Italy. An informal draft for an environmental protection agreement, along the lines of the Australian/French proposal, was drawn up to be used as a negotiating text in future discussions. The second session of the Special Consultative Meeting was held in Madrid in April this year. Although it seemed initially that an agreement was unlikely, the Consultative Parties reached a consensus on a draft protocol to the Antarctic Treaty.48 This protocol is a comprehensive agreement on environmental protection which incorporates, inter alia, a prohibition on minerals activity49 and is likely to include annexes on environmental impact assessment, marine pollution, waste disposal and the further protection of Antarctic fauna and flora. The amendment procedures established under Article 24 of the draft would mean that a conference to review the operation of the Protocol may be requested, after a period of fifty years, by any then current Consultative Party. If it is proposed that the mining prohibition be lifted, three-quarters of the then current Consultative Parties must support this, but that number must include all twenty-six Consultative Parties who negotiated the Protocol. If successful, and it now seems likely that it will be, the path Australia and France have taken in advocating the negotiation of a conservation agreement will represent a new dimension in Antarctic politics and a significant change to the instrumental framework of the Treaty system. In contrast with existing patterns it would involve acceptance by the Treaty parties of a 'top down' formulation of broad principles, rules and regulations on all aspects of environmental protection against which other activities in the Antarctic would be judged, as well as monitoring mechanisms and a formal requirement for compliance. Change in International Regimes Much of international relations theory rejects the notion that states act in anything other than self-interest which is often narrowly defined. Traditional models of cooperative international regimes suggest, therefore, that defection from norms occurs when states perceive that a particular interest cannot be met by the regime and that the gains from defection are greater than the costs of so doing. Change at an instrumental level is pursued when existing rules and procedures are considered to be no longer effective in attaining the goals and outcomes required, or when a states' goals and interests are redefined. However, that a state's goals and interests might become to be equated with a wider global or human interest such as environmental protection is seen, frequently, to be the realm of idealists. As already noted there were two aspects to the Australian and French decisions. The first was the decision on non-signature of CRAMRA which involved a temporary defection from the normative framework of the regime. The second concerned the issue of a comprehensive environmental protection convention, which involved proposed changes to the instrumental framework. In both cases the grounds for these actions were stated to rest on changed perceptions of how best to protect the Antarctic environment. An Australian diplomat has recently argued that 'the incremental processes which have so far characterised the work of the Treaty are inadequate to meet current needs' of environmental protection in the Antarctic (Brown 1990:12). Australia's stance was also couched in broader terms of a reordering of values in the international system. Senator Evans (1990a:120) has observed of Australia's proposal: '[i]n the diplomatic marketplace, where realism is the currency of trade, it is unusual to seek to redefine upwards the definition of what is possible. But that is what is required and it is what our initiative sets out to do'. However, while there has been little critical analysis of this case study to date, general commentary has offered a somewhat cynical interpretation of the broader environmental concerns upon which official Australian and French explanations of their actions are based. It has been suggested that Australia's action was a narrowly self-interested one that had more to do with the desire to protect, at some stage in the future, Australia's own minerals industry from being competitively disadvantaged as a result of subsidised activity in the Antarctic by non-Australian companies. The Australian delegation to the minerals negotiations had argued, unsuccessfully, for an anti-subsidy clause. Treasury in particular was thought to be unhappy with the absence of provisions in the Convention for specific royalty payments to claimant states. The Australian Mining Industry Council on the other hand, while it would certainly have preferred an anti-subsidy clause in the Convention, was particularly critical of the Australian government stance on CRAMRA.50 Critics of Australia and France have also suggested they adopted the NGO agenda for domestic political purposes. Certainly the 'green' vote was considered to be important in the months preceding the 1990 Australian election and there was a growing public sentiment that protection of the environment was important. However that begs the question of why that should be so. Clearly there were domestic inputs into this decision and one would expect to see domestic debate as part of the foreign policy making process. When Senator Evans tabled the Minerals Convention in the Australian Parliament he did so expressly for the purposes of community consultation. However an argument which considers only domestic electoral considerations (or even strictly economic interests) and rejects the validity of the broader environmental concerns is inadequate as an explanation of Australia's decision not to sign CRAMRA or, more particularly, its decision to pursue a comprehensive convention. It should not be overlooked that Australia in particular had an established record of arguing strongly at consultative meetings in favour of stringent environmental protection in the Antarctic. Indeed, it had first suggested the need for 'some unification of environmental standards or even some eventual "umbrella" agreement to cover conservation generally' (Rowland 1988:22) at the 1983 consultative meeting, a proposal it had tabled at subsequent meetings. Protection of the Antarctic environment had long been a stated objective of Australia's Antarctic policy.51 The question of a possible future conflict between this and other policy objectives, particularly that of benefit from resource exploitation, had not been overlooked in discussions on Australia's Antarctic policy (Harris 1984).52 For Australia, at least, the decision both on CRAMRA and, particularly on the priority given to environmental protection, was not a total departure from past policy, but rather a re-evaluation of policy objectives. Nevertheless, the 'community that had been so influential in previous important Antarctic decisions' (scientists, diplomats and lawyers) was by-passed in this re-evaluation (Burgess 1990:7).53 Harris (1990:17) has characterised the Australian decision as one which 'gave explicit priority to environmental protection, taken because of a belief that it is the priority the international community is likely to demand in the future, although of course domestic politics are the way in which these international pressures have increasingly manifested themselves'. This international pressure has manifested itself more through the activities of non-governmental organisations, and their domestic counterparts, rather than challenges by non-Treaty parties through the UN. In statements and speeches both Australia and France have referred to the rising tide of public opinion on environmental issues and the activities of non-governmental organisations. In Australia there was lengthy and successful mobilisation of public opinion against the Minerals Convention (both during its negotiation and after its adoption) by non-governmental organisations.54 In France, lobbying against the Convention by Captain Jacques Cousteau was particularly influential.55 Harris (1990:8) suggests that 'environmental objectives have been insufficiently central to the United Nations debates until recently to doubt whether such influence was substantially experienced through the UN'. Nevertheless, the changing attitudes of the Treaty parties since May 1989 may have been a response not only to general international public opinion but also to their concern that this issue may well become a focus of ongoing debates on Antarctica in the United Nations General Assembly and other international fora. From the point of view of the theoretical model outlined earlier in this paper, an analysis of the Australian/French decisions which seeks to consider a process of reordering of values in the international system, by which environmental interests are perceived to have parity with other interests and by which states interests are defined to take these new values into account, raises a number of questions which require further theoretical investigation but which can only be mentioned briefly here. Firstly, this is an area where the alleged traditional separation in international relations theory between domestic and international arenas breaks down. The question is how to explain successfully the relationship between the two in a theoretical way. Robert Putnam, for example (1988) offers a two-level game analysis as a metaphor for the 'puzzling tangle' of domestic politics and international relations, and the process of negotiation and reconciliation which need to take both components into account simultaneously. Secondly, can this case study be characterised as an exercise in the reconstitution of the concept of national self-interest in such a way that the 'shadow of the future' which is normally assumed to be heavily discounted assumes a larger value in the equation? If we choose to characterise these as new values which represent more than a change in perceptions of short-term self-interest or, at the very least, an 'enlightened self-interest' what are the processes of and the forces for change? How can the rational actor model be reconciled with the human interest model ½ or can it? Thirdly, how can we explain the role of non-governmental organisations which have been a critical part of this process of redefining norms and values by virtue of their representation and mobilisation of public opinion, nationally and internationally, in the cause of the wider human interest? Those approaches in International Relations theory which seek to explain non-state, transnational actors and their influences on the world of states have most often focused on organisations such as Transnational Corporations which have their own, and often competing, self interests, or on intergovernmental organisations. However, here we should look, perhaps, to the work of Oran Young (1989a and 1989b) whose model of institutional bargaining also incorporates the role of transnational alliances of interest groups, or to that of Peter Haas (1989) who offers the concept of 'epistemic communities' which may encompass domestic and transnational interest groups. Conclusion This paper has traversed a variety of issues, both case-specific and theoretical, relating to the decision by Australia and France not to sign the Antarctic Minerals Convention and to pursue the negotiation of a comprehensive conservation convention. It has offered an analysis of the composition of the normative framework which underpins the Antarctic Treaty system and has set out to show how the actions of Australia and France have represented a defection from those norms. More particularly it has canvassed possible explanations for that defection, and for the attempts by those parties to introduce a new direction to the instrumental framework of the Treaty system. In this respect this paper urges a consideration, both in respect of this case study and as an issue that warrants continued investigation in the theory of international relations more generally, of the question of a reconstitution of values and the notion of 'self-interest' based, in part at least, on a recognition of a wider human interest. Non-governmental environmental organisations, acting nationally and internationally, are considered to have a role in that process. It is argued, therefore, that a theoretical consideration of these processes should deal with the admittedly difficult problem of incorporating the linkages between domestic politics and international relations, with an analysis of the role of transnational non-state actors in a regime. Bibliography 'Antarctic Antics', New Scientist 122(1667), 3 June 1989:20. Auburn, F.A. (1982). Antarctic Law and Politics, C. Hurst & Co., London. Barnes, James N. (1990). 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The Final Report and the Final Act of the Fourth Special Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, together with the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, 2 June 1988, Wellington. * The author would like to thank Stuart Harris for his helpful comments on this paper, and Nancy Viviani for her comments on an earlier version.n 1 In full, the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities. 2 A detailed analysis of the negotiations is therefore not the focus of this paper. The negotiating texts were leaked to the press, and non-governmental organisations published their own reports of the meetings, but other documentation from the minerals negotiations remains confidential. 3 Of course, new actors might also join with the specific intention of undermining the regime. Whether they are successful or not will depend on the extent to which they, too, become socialised into the norms of the regime and subsequently reassess their perceptions of their own interests. 4 This can mean, of course, that change is avoided even when new mechanisms are required. 5 The Treaty was negotiated in 1959 by twelve countries ½ Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. 6 Any member of the United Nations may accede to the Treaty. Any state which is not a UN member may accede upon invitation by the Consultative Parties. Consultative Party status may be held during such time as an acceding state (Non-consultative Party) carries out substantial scientific activity (the time constraint does not apply to the original twelve signatories). However this status is not automatically achieved upon the conduct of scientific research ½ the decision is made by the existing Consultative Parties. 7 The Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (which was agreed to in 1972 but which did not enter into force until 1978), the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) which was agreed to in 1980 and came into effect in 1982, and the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (agreed to in 1988 but entry into force now most unlikely). The Treaty parties also negotiated the Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora, which was agreed to as Recommendation VIII at the third Consultative Meeting in 1964, by which the Antarctic was declared a Special Conservation Area. 8 For a useful, and concise, contemporary summary of the interests of individual states in the Antarctic Treaty system, see Rowland 1988:15-25. 9 In order of claims, United Kingdom (1908), New Zealand (1923), France (1924), Australia (1933), Norway (1939), Chile (1940) and Argentina (1943), although the latter two asserted that they were merely reinforcing claims which existed by right of historical inheritance from the empire of Spain. Fifteen per cent of the Antarctic is not subject to any formal claim. 10 One might ask to what extent these Treaty parties will continue to see the collective good as having any relevance to their interests in the absence of resource activity. 11 Peterson (1988:42) characterises this as a 'suggestive norm' ½ that parties should avoid conflict on territorial sovereignty. 12 The negotiating environment was improved because the International Geophysical Year (1957-58) gave Antarctic nations a political 'breathing space' on the sovereignty issue and the opportunity to link political solutions to the successful international scientific cooperation that was underway. During the IGY the exercise of sovereign rights was effectively held in abeyance by all seven claimant states and all military activity was banned. The IGY, however, increased the number of players. As well as the claimant states and the US, a further four countries (the USSR, Japan, South Africa, Belgium) established an active presence in the Antarctic during that time. 13 As well as the seven claimants, the United States was particularly active in the Antarctic from the late 1920s onwards. Its policy, however, was characterised by ambivalence and lack of direction, especially with regard to the question of asserting a claim of its own. 14 Australia was especially concerned: Soviet IGY bases had been established in 'its' territory, directly to the south of Australia. 15 Head of the Antarctic section of the British Foreign Office, and possessed of lengthy experience in Antarctic matters. 16 At least until the May 1989 decision by Australia. 17 Consultative Parties do not formally vote on recommendations. 18 The practice has been, however, to consider recommendations as interim guidelines until such time as they become formally effective. 19 Poland had acceded to the Treaty on 8 June 1961, 15 days before the instruments of ratification of Australia, Chile and Argentina were deposited. 20 This includes both the former East and West Germany. With the reunification of that country, there are now 39 signatories, of which 26 have Consultative status. 21 There is still no secretariat, for example, in spite of that issue having been under consideration at a number of consultative meetings, because a consensus cannot be reached. However it is possible that this issue might finally be settled, albeit in a very modest way, at the forthcoming 16th Consultative Meeting. 22 The Treaty sets out, in Article IX a list of things upon which the Treaty parties may consult and make recommendations. The 'preservation and conservation of living resources' is the last on a list of six, and is the only one not referred to anywhere else in the articles of the Treaty. Non-living resources are not referred to at all, and neither is the protection of the environment. In the case of non-living resources this was a deliberate omission given the links between resources and the question of ownership, which would have made a successful negotiation of the Treaty impossible. The general issue of protection of the environment was not a heightened part of the consciousness of the time. 23 A list of recommendations adopted under this broad issue would include the following: conservation of fauna and flora, historic sites and monuments, pelagic sealing specially protected areas and species, sites of special scientific interest, effects of tourist and non-governmental expeditions, disposal of nuclear wastes, oil contamination, waste disposal, code of conduct for expedition, environmental impact assessment, marine living resources and mineral resources. 24 Agenda items are frequently referred to subsequent meetings because there had not been enough time to consider them fully, or because reports requested had not yet been received. 25 In the last decade especially, and particularly since Greenpeace established its scientific base at Cape Evans, NGOs have drawn attention to these violations. These include problems of fuel seepage, waste disposal, disturbance of penguin rookeries, and the construction of the French airstrip at Dumont D'Urville. 26 These were known as Beeby 1 through 6 (after Christopher Beeby, the New Zealand diplomat who had the onerous task of chairing the minerals negotiation meetings). Beeby 7 was adopted as the draft convention. 27 Which was used to support the argument that a search for new sources of oil should be undertaken. 28 In the United States, petroleum companies approached the government for permission to carry out exploration work. The US government dissuaded them because there was as yet no authority to grant a licence in an area that the US considered was not a global commons. 29 Although traces of a large number of minerals have been described in Antarctica, no commercial deposits of either hard rock minerals or hydrocarbons (oil or gas) have been found. Most commentators argued that there was little likelihood of minerals activities going ahead in the Antarctic in the near future, if ever, but that if viable deposits were found the Convention would mean that rules were already in place to deal with such activities. 30 This series of meetings began with the Nansen Foundation Meeting in 1973. A special preparatory meeting was held in 1976 for the ninth consultative meeting in 1977. A group of experts met at the ninth consultative meeting which established another group of experts. That second group met in 1979. At the tenth ATCM (1979) two working groups were established for the duration of that meeting ½ one to deal with legal and political aspects, and one to deal with scientific and environmental questions of minerals activities. 31 This phrase was used throughout the recommendation except at paragraph 6 which referred to 'a regime for mineral exploration and exploitation in Antarctica' (see Handbook 1989:3307). 32 This point was repeated in paragraph 6 of the recommendation which stated that any regime should be acceptable, and without prejudice, to claimant and non-claimant states. 33 When the negotiations commenced there were fourteen Consultative Parties, all of whom participated in the sessions. From January 1984, sixteen were involved; eighteen from April 1986 and twenty from January 1988 (the penultimate negotiating session). From the February/March 1985 meeting, the Non-consultative Parties were invited to attend as observers. 34 It has been acknowledged that this was a less than propitious title which implies that minerals activity is assured (a point that supporters of the regime are quick to counter). For that reason most refer to it now as the Antarctic Minerals Convention, the Wellington Convention or simply by its less revealing acronyn, CRAMRA (pronounced as it is spelled!). 35 See, for example, testimony by James N. Barnes, of the Antarctica Project, to the House Subcommittees on Transportation, Aviation and Materials, and Science, Research and Technology of the Committee on Science, Space and Technology, concerning Antarctic Minerals Policy, on 12 July 1990. 36 During the meeting in Montevideo the head of the Chilean delegation apparently made an informal suggestion that perhaps, instead of negotiating a minerals agreement, they should be negotiating for an Antarctic Treaty Park. 37 Under Article 62 of the Convention, entry into force requirements were that 16 of the 20 Consultative Parties which participated in the final conference of the Special Consultative Meeting had to ratify the Convention: this was to include all claimants, both superpowers as well as representing 5 developing and 11 developed nations. 38 What Putnam (1988:438) refers to as involuntary defection. 39 Because Australia is a claimant state, its signature and ratification was required before the Convention could come into force. There has been some debate on whether the action of Australia automatically cast the convention into a legal abyss. Clearly it raised questions about its future. There was still the possibility for Australia to accede to the convention at a later stage, which would bring it into effect if all other ratifications conditions had been met. 40 This joint statement also addressed other issues of common environmental concern. 41 Especially given that they are Original Signatories and Claimant States and thus should be more strongly socialised into the norms of the Treaty system, and more aware of the utility of the system to their own interests. 42 Letter from Janet Mullins, Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs, US Department of State (dated 3 January 1990) to Chairman [sic] Udell of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs in response to a letter, dated 9 November 1989, from Udell and five Subcommittee Chairpersons to President Bush requesting the US Government to consider the Australian proposal for an Antarctic Environment Protection Convention in lieu of CRAMRA. 43 At this meeting, the item that had been on the agenda since the Sixth Consultative Meeting in 1970 as 'Man's Impact on the Antarctic Environment' was listed as 'Human Impact on the Antarctic Environment'. The outcome of this meeting is open to interpretation. Those opposed to the Australian/French initiative argued that it received little support. Australian reports focused on the common ground that was reached. It appears that there was little support at that stage for the substance of the Australian/French proposal although the need to strengthen environmental protection measures was accepted. Reports suggest that Romania, Czechoslovakia, the Netherlands and Bulgaria also supported the Australian/French proposal. 44 Agreement on this recommendation was conditional upon acceptance of a recommendation to also convene a meeting to discuss the liability protocol called for under Article 8.7 of the Minerals Convention. A meeting on the latter, which lasted only half a day, was held at the same time as the Chile meeting. 45 See Hansard, NZ Parliament: 27 February 1990:161 46 Senator Evans recently announced that similar legislation would be introduced into the Australian parliament. 47 Although US negotiators at Antarctic Treaty meetings have taken this to mean that a time limit for such a ban can be imposed. 48 The draft Protocol has been submitted to Consultative governments for endorsement. A further meeting has been scheduled for late June in Madrid at which time, if all endorsements are forthcoming, the Final Act of the Special Consultative Meeting will be settled. The Protocol will then be subject to formal ratification procedures in each signatory government. 49 Under Article 6. 50 The Australian Mining Industry Council has indicated that its criticism of the Australian Government decision was based on its traditional opposition to locking up any areas and ruling out the option of mining some time in the future (cited in Dunn, 1989). 51 See for example the discussions by Spencer and Brook in Harris (1984). 52 Support for the world park proposal had been offered as one possible policy option for Australia. This, it was suggested, could be supported not only on environmental grounds, but also as 'simply the most effective way of maintaining a degree of sovereignty and involvement in the management of Antarctic affairs' (Harris 1984:18). 53 The British Prime Minister, John Major, recently announced his government's support for the new Protocol thus bypassing possible objections by traditional civil service decision-makers on the Antarctic which might have arisen even though the British delegation at Madrid had agreed to the draft. 54 And both the Opposition, and the Democrats in the Senate, called for the non-signature of CRAMRA. 55 His petition on the Antarctic collected over one million signatures. Cousteau also presented a report, in June 1989, on the question of Antarctic to President Mitterand (at the request of the latter) who expressed the view that he was much taken with the idea of turning the Antarctic continent into a vast peaceful nature reserve. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- end of file